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Developments in Administrative 
Law: The 2004-2005 Term 
Laverne Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2004-2005 Supreme Court term was marked by the Court’s 
emphasis on respect for legislative intent and for the administrative 
processes developed by the state. This dual theme manifested itself in 
various ways and was apparent in all the cases decided this term. How-
ever, if there was consensus on the aspiration to be achieved, the Court 
was far from unanimous in deciding on the best method to realize this 
objective, making for a very lively term of administrative law decision-
making. 
During the 2004-2005 term, the Supreme Court addressed four ma-
jor issues. The Court revisited the issue of exclusive and concurrent 
jurisdiction, revealing deep divides in its opinion of the correct approach 
to be taken to determine which adjudicative body has jurisdiction when 
more than one appear capable of being seized of a matter. On the subject 
of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, there have been four key cases. 
In Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney General);1 Quebec (Attorney General) v. 
Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal)2 and Canada (House of Commons) v. 
Vaid,3 the Court considered the competing jurisdictions of human rights 
tribunals and another statutory regime. In Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson 
School Board,4 the Court examined the issue of the residual remedial 
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1 [2004] S.C.J. No. 34, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185 [hereinafter “Morin”]. 
2 [2004] S.C.J. No. 35, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter “Charette”]. 
3 [2005] S.C.J. No. 28, 2005 SCC 30 [hereinafter “Vaid”]. 
4 Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board; Casimir v. Quebec (Attorney General); 
Zorilla v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 257 [hereinafter 
“Okwuobi”]. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153423
44  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
jurisdiction of superior courts to provide relief in constitutional matters 
over which a tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. The Court looked at the 
relationship between the exclusive jurisdiction of the Administrative 
Tribunal of Quebec and the Superior Court with respect to the power to 
grant constitutional remedies and offered guidance in this respect. By 
far, the most significant amount of the Supreme Court’s administrative 
law energy was spent last term on questions relating to exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction. Given the unsettled nature of the law in this area 
and the many questions left unanswered, issues relating to exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction will undoubtedly continue to plague the Court in 
the future.  
Additional administrative law issues addressed by the Supreme Court 
this term include the right to independent adjudication, discussed in 
Vaughan v. Canada;5 the standard of review at a secondary level of appel-
late review, explored in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)6 and another look at expertise and deference in Monsanto 
Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services).7  
While the number of administrative law cases decided this term has 
not been numerous, the decisions rendered have been rich, provocative 
and telling of the areas where the Court is unified and of those where it 
will have to return to solidify its guiding principles. This article dis-
cusses the seven administrative law cases decided during the 2004-2005 
term,8 examining them along the lines of the four major issues addressed 
by the Court: (1) Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction, (2) The Right 
to Independent Adjudication, (3) Standard of Review and (4) Expertise 
and Deference. 
                                                                                                                                
5 [2005] S.C.J. No. 12, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 146 [hereinafter “Vaughan”]. It should be noted 
that Vaughan is a case that also deals with exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. The importance of 
the case to the administrative law jurisprudence relating to procedural fairness and independent 
adjudication has led to its placement in a separate category.  
6 [2005] S.C.J. No. 39, 2005 SCC 40 [hereinafter “Mugesera”]. 
7 [2004] S.C.J. No. 51, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 [hereinafter “Monsanto”]. 
8 Two of these, the companion cases of Morin and Charette, were decided a few weeks 
before the end of the 2003-2004 term. 
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II. EXCLUSIVE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
It has been 10 years since the decision in Weber v. Ontario Hydro.9 
However, the fire raging around the issues of concurrent and exclusive 
jurisdiction continues to flare. In Weber, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question of whether the arbitration process established through la-
bour relations regimes precludes courts of common law from addressing 
the same matters. Mr. Weber, a unionized worker, had attempted to sue 
his employer in tort and for breach of his Charter rights over a work-
related dispute. The employer succeeded in having the actions dismissed 
on the ground that the province’s Labour Relations Act10 and the terms 
of the collective agreement together created an exclusive system of 
arbitration. As a result of this exclusive jurisdiction, any disputes which, 
in their essential character, arose expressly or inferentially from the 
collective agreement were foreclosed to the courts. In adopting the ex-
clusive jurisdiction model for the unionized labour context, the Supreme 
Court rejected the overlapping and concurrent models.11 Since Weber, 
several cases have upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators. 
In addition, the principles of Weber have expanded beyond the labour 
context to other legislated decision-making schemes. They have also 
extended beyond jurisdictional conflict between courts and tribunals to 
address questions of jurisdictional conflict between tribunals as well.12
In the past year, the Supreme Court furthered the debate started in 
Weber by revisiting the issue of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction in 
four noteworthy cases: Morin, Charette, Vaid and Okwuobi.  
                                                                                                                                
9 [1995] S.C.J. No. 59, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 [hereinafter “Weber”]. 
10 R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2. 
11 For a discussion of Weber, see Philip L. Bryden, “Developments in Administrative Law: 
The 1994-1995 Term” (1996) 7 S.C.L.R. (2d) 27.  
12 Literature on the impact of Weber includes: Bernard Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap Be-
tween Arbitration and Other Forums: An Update” (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 179; Ray Brown and Brian 
Etherington, “Weber v. Ontario Hydro: A Denial of Access to Justice for the Organized Em-
ployee?” (1996) 4 C.L.E.L.J. 183; Donald D. Carter, “Looking at Weber Five Years Later: Is it time 
for a New Approach?” (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 231; Richard MacDowell, “Labour Arbitration — The 
New Labour Court?” (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 121. 
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1. Determining Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae Between Competing 
Tribunals: Morin, Charette and Vaid 
Morin and Charette raise important questions about the manner of 
determining legislative intent when dealing with competing administra-
tive regimes. In particular, the Court reveals significant disagreements 
over the application of the “essential character” test — the test that 
figures centrally in administrative law to determine legislative intent 
when there are competing jurisdictions. These cases are followed by 
Vaid, which takes a much more subdued approach to the same issue, 
although leaving many of the unanswered questions untouched. All 
three cases deal with a Human Rights Tribunal as one of the competing 
administrative schemes, which also makes one wonder about the effect 
of these cases on statutory human rights regimes. 
This section presents a detailed and critical overview of these cases, 
focusing on the debates between members of the Court.  
(a) Morin 
In 1997, several teachers’ unions entered into a modification of a 
collective agreement that they held with the province of Quebec. The 
modification discounted experience acquired during the 1996-1997 
school year, with the result that the 1996-1997 year would not be cred-
ited in calculating salary increments or seniority. A minority group 
made up of younger and less experienced teachers were the only ones 
affected by the modified term. They complained to the Quebec Human 
Rights Commission that the newly negotiated term was discriminatory. 
The Commission brought the matter before the Quebec Human Rights 
Tribunal, asking for a declaration that the terms of the collective agree-
ment violated the equality provisions of the Quebec Charter of human 
rights and freedoms.13  
The Human Rights Tribunal’s jurisdiction was questioned at the 
hearing. The Attorney General of Quebec along with the school boards 
and the unions filed preliminary motions arguing that labour arbitrators 
had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute and requesting the Human 
Rights Tribunal to decline hearing the matter. Although the Human 
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Rights Tribunal rejected the motion,14 on appeal to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, it was held that the proper forum for resolving this dispute was 
the process of arbitration set up under the collective agreement.15 At 
issue, therefore, before the Supreme Court was whether the legislature 
intended the Human Rights Tribunal or labour arbitration to be the fo-
rum in which this type of dispute would be heard and the test that should 
be applied to resolve such conflicts of jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Human Rights Tribunal 
had jurisdiction over the dispute. However, their decision contained 
majority and dissenting reasons. The majority was represented by 
McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major, Binnie and Fish JJ. Their reasons 
were authored by McLachlin C.J. The dissenting judges were Basta-
rache and Arbour JJ. with reasons written by Bastarache J. 
(i) The Majority 
Chief Justice McLachlin framed the issue in this case as being 
whether the Human Rights Tribunal should be barred from hearing a 
complaint of discrimination because the labour arbitrator has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the dispute.16 She confirmed that the approach to be 
taken in the labour context to decide which of two possible tribunals 
should hear a dispute derives from Weber and clarified the propositions 
for which Weber stands in her view. First, Weber indicates that there are 
three models of jurisdiction: concurrent, overlapping, and exclusive, and 
that all three models are legally possible. Chief Justice McLachlin em-
phasized explicitly that Weber does not stand for the proposition that 
labour arbitrators always have exclusive jurisdiction in employer-union 
disputes. She also reminded us that it is not possible to stand back and 
theoretically classify cases into categories of matters that will and will 
not fall within the exclusive authority of arbitrators. 
Second, on a more general level, in order to determine which of 
the three models should prevail in a given situation, Weber holds that 
it is important to consider “the governing legislation, as applied to the 
dispute viewed in its factual matrix.”17 As she proceeded through her 
                                                                                                                                
14 [2000] J.T.D.P.Q. no. 24. 
15 [2002] Q.J. No. 365 (C.A.). 
16 Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 1.  
17 Id., at para 11. 
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reasons, the Chief Justice offered a two-step test for conducting this 
analysis. The first step involves examining the relevant legislation and 
what it says about the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The second calls for 
scrutiny of the nature of the dispute to see whether the legislation 
suggests that this particular dispute should fall exclusively to the arbi-
trator. At this stage, the dispute is to be examined in its full factual 
context, which requires disregarding the dispute’s legal characteriza-
tion. The fact that a dispute has been labelled a tort claim, a human 
rights claim or any other type of claim by the parties etc., is not a de-
terminative indication of which body has jurisdiction. By contrast, one 
must look for the “essential character” of the dispute — that is, the na-
ture of the dispute informed by its full factual matrix — to see if it falls 
within the legislated province of an arbitrator’s exclusive jurisdiction.18  
Examining the provisions of the two relevant pieces of legislation 
— the Quebec Labour Code19 and the Quebec Charter, McLachlin C.J. 
determined that the arbitrator possessed jurisdiction to resolve all dis-
agreements arising over the interpretation or application of a collective 
agreement. She noted that in Weber, this jurisdiction was found to be 
exclusive. The Human Rights Tribunal, on the other hand, had vast 
jurisdiction over human rights matters in Quebec and the power to apply 
the Quebec Charter in a wide range of circumstances. Its decision-
making authority over human rights violations could not be said to be 
exclusive, though, as it was clear from the way that the Quebec Charter 
had been drafted that the legislator envisaged jurisdictional concurrency 
with other adjudicative bodies.20  
As for the essential character of the dispute, McLachlin C.J. held 
that the essential character is discrimination in the context of negotiating 
a collective agreement. As this is a matter that fell outside of the scope 
of labour arbitration, the Human Rights Tribunal was entitled to exer-
cise its jurisdiction. Chief Justice McLachlin’s conclusion rests primar-
ily on the finding that the facts of the dispute did not deal with the 
interpretation or application of the collective agreement — the domain 
over which the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction according to the 
Quebec Labour Code. Rather, the issue in dispute dealt with alleged 
discrimination during the period of negotiation of the modified term, a 
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period preceding the establishment of the agreement itself. In other 
words, while it is clear that the Labour Code provides that the arbitrator 
has jurisdiction over all grievances arising from the “interpretation or 
application” of the collective agreement, the dispute in this case did not 
arise from either the interpretation or the application of the agreement 
but during a stage that predated the agreement itself. As McLachlin C.J. 
observed:  
[e]veryone agrees on how the agreement, if valid, should be 
interpreted and applied. The only question is whether the process 
leading to the adoption of the alleged discriminatory clause and the 
inclusion of that clause in the agreement violates the Quebec Charter, 
rendering unenforceable21
In her view, the main fact animating the dispute was that the modi-
fied term treated the complainants less favourably than more senior 
teachers. Its essence was potential discrimination in the process of nego-
tiation and in the inclusion of the term in the collective agreement. Chief 
Justice McLachlin held that the Tribunal had the power to deal with this 
matter. The matter fell outside of the scope of the arbitrator’s exclusive 
jurisdiction and the Human Rights Commission and Tribunal were cre-
ated by the legislature to resolve precisely these sorts of issues.  
The Chief Justice completed her reasons by addressing a final ar-
gument that had been raised to contest the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It had 
been argued that the complainants could have had their concerns heard 
by asking the union to bring a grievance to arbitration under the collec-
tive agreement. Chief Justice McLachlin rejected this argument on three 
grounds. First, she repeated that the dispute could not be characterized 
as a grievance under the collective agreement since the claim was not 
that the agreement was violated, but that the nature of the agreement 
itself was discriminatory. She added that it might be possible for an 
arbitrator to consider such questions as an incidental matter to a dispute 
that arose under the collective agreement, but that in this particular 
dispute, the complainants could not be faulted for pursuing their claim at 
the Human Rights Commission and Tribunal. Moreover, McLachlin C.J. 
pointed out that the unions and the complainants were opposed in inter-
est in this matter since the union was affiliated with one of the parties 
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that negotiated the agreement. It is possible that the union would not 
have chosen to file a grievance on the complainants’ behalf. If that had 
occurred, there would have been no effective recourse for the affected 
teachers to bring their complaint. Relying on the grievance process 
would have provided the complainants with only the hope but not the 
guarantee of resolving their dispute.  
Finally, McLachlin C.J. asserted that the Human Rights Tribunal 
was a “better fit” for this dispute, a comment which garnered significant 
reaction in the dissenting opinion. The Chief Justice reasoned that be-
cause the challenge had widespread implications, affecting hundreds of 
teachers, the Human Rights Tribunal was a better suited forum than the 
appointment of an arbitrator to deal with a single grievance within the 
framework of the Labour Code.  
(ii) The Dissent 
Justice Bastarache’s dissenting reasons centre on two main subjects: 
the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators and the integration of fundamen-
tal rights into the arbitration process. He also offered policy reasons for 
why exclusive arbitral jurisdiction should be fostered. Justice Basta-
rache was very clear to set out his starting premise — namely, that ex-
clusive arbitral jurisdiction is a well-established principle in Quebec law 
in the context of labour relations. From this perspective, he viewed the 
issue to be resolved in Morin as whether the principle of exclusive juris-
diction should be abandoned in favour of a statutory human rights re-
gime in cases where the labour dispute raises a human rights issue. His 
conclusion was that the dispute in Morin should have remained within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration. He found that the matter 
in dispute was one relating to the application of the collective agree-
ment, since its essential character concerned pay and the reimbursement 
of lost wages resulting from the refusal to recognize experience. Most 
interesting is his analysis, which brings to light some very deep and 
critical disagreements in the Court over the primacy of the exclusive 
jurisdiction model and the nature and application of the essential charac-
ter test. In order to best view these divergences and their significance, it 
is useful to organize and consider his analysis along three themes: (A) 
models of jurisdiction (B) the essential character test and (C) the incor-
poration of human rights into labour arbitration.  
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(A) MODELS OF JURISDICTION — THREE MODELS OR ONE? 
Perhaps the most surprising statement to come out of the decision in 
Morin is the majority’s holding that Weber stands for the proposition 
that all the three models of jurisdiction — exclusive, concurrent and 
overlapping — are possible and that exclusive arbitral jurisdiction was 
never meant to be the standard model used in employer-union disputes. 
There is no presumption of arbitral exclusivity in abstracto; it is always 
a question of determining whether the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the dispute in light of the factual context and relevant legisla-
tion.22 The majority also implied that other tribunals may possess 
exclusive jurisdiction in a labour dispute, depending on the legislation 
and the nature of the dispute.23 This interpretation seems to go against 
the principles developed in Weber itself, principles which the Supreme 
Court has since held consistently, as illustrated by key decisions such as 
New Brunswick v. O’Leary,24 Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) 
Board of Police Commissioners25 and Parry Sound (District) Social 
Services Administration Board v. Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union, Local 324 (O.P.S.E.U.).26
Justice Bastarache was quick to disagree with the majority, whom 
he perceived to have abandoned its own precedent. He pointed out that 
the “Court has, on numerous occasions and in a variety of legislative 
contexts, recognized that arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction over 
issues arising from the interpretation, application, administration or 
violation of a collective agreement.”27 In Weber, the exclusive jurisdic-
tion model had been adopted for three reasons. It continued the path of 
earlier jurisprudence, the statutory language provided for exclusive 
jurisdiction, and it helped promote the speedy, economic, final, and 
enforceable resolution of labour disputes. In his opinion, McLachlin C.J. 
abandoned the exclusive jurisdiction model (and the essential character 
                                                                                                                                
22 Id., at para. 14. 
23 Id., at para. 11. 
24 [1995] S.C.J. No. 60, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 967 [hereinafter “O’Leary”]. This was the com-
panion case to Weber. 
25 [2000] S.C.J. No. 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 360 [hereinafter “Regina Police”]. 
26 [2003] S.C.J. No. 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter “Parry Sound”]. 
27 Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 43. 
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test that accompanies it) for the “best fit approach”, an approach which 
he argued had been rejected already in Weber.28
What is one to make of the Supreme Court’s change in position? 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasons seem to suggest that Weber should 
simply be read more narrowly than it has been in the past. She noted 
that exclusive arbitral jurisdiction was found in Weber because the lan-
guage of the statute indicated exclusivity over certain matters and the 
facts fit within this reach. Yet, the reasons offered in Weber for finding 
exclusive jurisdiction were based not only in the statutory language, but 
also on broader policy reasons such as fostering the resolution of all 
labour disputes in one dispute resolution process so that they can be 
done quickly and economically. Strangely, as Bastarache J. pointed 
out,29 it was McLachlin C.J. herself who enounced this principle in We-
ber, holding that the exclusive jurisdiction model “satisfies the concern 
that the dispute resolution process which the various labour statutes of 
this country have established should not be duplicated and undermined 
by concurrent actions.”30
Chief Justice McLachlin also asserted that there is no principle of 
exclusivity in abstracto as Bastarache J. had held with respect to arbi-
tral jurisdiction. But Bastarache J. placed much emphasis on defending 
the idea that the Quebec Labour Code is an exclusive and comprehen-
sive decision-making scheme designed by the legislature to govern all 
aspects of labour relations in unionized contexts. He referred to provi-
sions of the Labour Code to illustrate that the legislator’s intent was to 
create such an exclusive and comprehensive scheme. He highlighted 
that the Labour Code mandates that “every grievance” be submitted to 
arbitration and that this is similar in spirit to the Ontario Labour Rela-
tions Act, examined in Weber, which required “all differences” to be 
sent to arbitration. Since the Ontario Act was found to attract the ex-
clusive jurisdiction model in Weber, the Labour Code should have the 
same result too. That Morin will undoubtedly have practical ramifica-
tions for labour relations is clear, for as Bastarache J. and the Court of 
Appeal in Morin point out, many years of jurisprudence have been 
                                                                                                                                
28 Id., at para. 45. 
29 Id., at para. 43. 
30 Weber, supra, note 9, at para. 58. See as well the dicta of McLachlin J. (as she then 
was), at para. 46 of Weber. 
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built on the original Weber principles, including much of the labour 
jurisprudence in Quebec.31
Viewed from another perspective, the change in position in Morin 
could be seen as an attempt by the Court to champion the primacy of 
legislative intention while reducing judicial policy development in mat-
ters mandated to the administrative state. If this is the case, it fits quite 
well within the broader movement of the Supreme Court to privilege 
legislative will. Seen most acutely in cases like Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. 
British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing 
Branch),32 the drive to establish and follow the will of the legislature has 
also become quite prevalent in other areas of administrative law, most 
notably in the standard of review jurisprudence.33
But if McLachlin C.J.’s goal is indeed to keep within the framework 
of the legislator’s intention, then it is hard to reconcile this with her final 
reason for holding that the Human Rights Tribunal was the correct fo-
rum. As noted, McLachlin C.J. added that the Human Rights Tribunal is 
a “better fit” for the dispute since the dispute has implications for hun-
dreds of other teachers. A finding of the most appropriate forum based 
on legislative intent would presumably rest solely on the legislation and 
the facts. It may be that the collective aspect is an implicit legislative 
goal, but certainly the fact of relying on this goal as existing implicitly 
would need to be expressed more clearly in order to avoid the criticism 
that Bastarache J. makes that choosing the forum that the Court sees as 
best suited was denounced back in Weber.34 It will be interesting to see 
how the court balances legislative intent with judicial policy making as 
it develops its jurisprudence on jurisdiction ratione materiae in the 
future.  
                                                                                                                                
31 See Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 51 and the Court of Appeal decision, Québec (Com-
mission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. Québec (Procureure générale), 
[2002] J.Q. no. 365, at paras. 106 and 107. 
32 [2001] S.C.J. No. 17, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 [hereinafter “Ocean Port”]. 
33 See for example, Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick 
Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 [hereinafter 
“Bibeault”]; Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2 
S.C.R. 557; Director of Investigation and Research v. Southam Inc. et al. (1997), 144 D.L.R. (4th) 
1 and Pushpanathan v.Canada (Min. of Citizenship), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982. 
34 One could even take Bastarache J.’s argument further by observing that the recent rever-
sal of the Supreme Court’s position on the ability of tribunals to decide Charter matters marks a 
more recent denunciation of the view that the appropriate way to determine the correct fora for 
disputes is by simple judicial evaluation of which forum is best suited. 
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(B) THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER TEST 
Both the majority and dissent formulate the essential character test 
in a similar way. The test requires an examination of the nature of the 
dispute to determine if it falls within the realm of matters over which the 
legislature has granted the arbitrator exclusive jurisdiction. In establish-
ing the essential character, one is to analyze the facts giving rise to the 
dispute and take guidance from them. The majority and the dissent also 
agree in principle that legal characterization should not be a determina-
tive factor. Nevertheless, despite the similarity in their manners of for-
mulating the test, the majority and dissent reach quite opposite results 
about the essential character of the teachers’ claim in Morin. 
Unlike McLachlin C.J. for the majority, Bastarache J. had no diffi-
culty seeing the facts of this case as an instance of the application of the 
collective agreement. In his view, the essential character of the dispute 
dealt with pay and the recognition of teaching experience, two issues at 
the heart of working conditions. Justice Bastarache asserted further that 
the issue in this case concerned the reimbursement of lost wages stem-
ming from lack of recognition of the teaching experience in question. 
This, too, were within the scope of the collective agreement.  
Moreover, Bastarache J. criticized the majority for misapplying the 
test. He noted a change of course in the way that the majority had 
analyzed the issue in this case. In his view, they took into account the 
legal characterization of the matter as being important though non-
determinative of the matter.35 Justice Bastarache was of the opinion 
that McLachlin C.J. relied too heavily on the nature of the right in-
voked: she merely characterized the grievance as the assertion of a 
Quebec Charter right and concluded that such an assertion, in its es-
sential character, did not arise from the interpretation or application of 
the collective agreement.36  
As for the Chief Justice’s holding that the phase during which a col-
lective agreement is negotiated does not fall within an arbitrator’s juris-
diction, Bastarache J. made two counterpoints. First, the negotiation of a 
collective agreement is not the same as the creation of a contract before 
the collective agreement is signed. In the latter case, Canadian courts 
have held that arbitrators do not have jurisdiction if the matter is not 
                                                                                                                                
35 Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 46.  
36 Id., at para. 55. 
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related to the collective agreement. Here, the negotiation was closely 
linked to the application of the agreement. Second, it is not a simple 
matter to separate negotiations from the collective agreement itself. 
Under the Labour Code, a collective agreement represents a collection 
of provisions negotiated by the parties. In this case, it was not the nego-
tiations that caused the alleged harm but the effect of the negotiations — 
that is, the provision resulting from the modification. Overall, Basta-
rache J. found that the essential character of the dispute related to the 
application of the collective agreement and, as such, fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 
Justice Bastarache’s analysis of the essential character raises ques-
tions about the framework within which we are to work when determin-
ing the essential nature of the dispute. Are we to look at the “facts 
surrounding the dispute” or the “facts giving rise to the dispute”? Both 
expressions have been used in the Supreme Court case law37 and while 
the difference in wording seems minor, the effect can be significant. In 
the case of Morin, the dissenting judges considered the facts surround-
ing the dispute and this led to a much broader scope of potentially rele-
vant facts. They looked not only to what has happened in the past but 
also to the purpose and result of the application before the Court: 
In the case at bar, an examination of the factual context shows that the 
dispute, in its essential character, concerns pay and the taking into 
account of experience gained during the 1996-1997 school year for the 
purpose of setting pay. Such issues form the very foundation of a 
contract and working conditions. More specifically, this application 
concerns the reimbursement of lost wages resulting from the refusal to 
recognize experience gained over the 1996-1997 school year, an issue 
that is clearly within the scope of the collective agreement. 38  
The approach of the dissent contrasts with that of the majority 
judges who searched for the catalyst of the disagreement. Drawing a 
distinction between Morin and Weber, for example, McLachlin C.J. 
wrote: 
                                                                                                                                
37 The expression “the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties” can be found in 
Regina Police, supra, note 25 and in the dissent in Morin, id., at paras. 53 and 56. Both Regina 
Police and the dissent in Morin were authored by Bastarache J. who seems to favour this formula-
tion: “the facts giving rise to the dispute” is employed; Weber, supra, note 9, at para. 29 and in 
Vaid, supra, note 3, at para. 93. The idea is used in the majority decision in Morin. 
38 Morin, id., at para. 57 (emphasis added). 
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[…] the critical difference between Weber and this case lies in the 
factual context that gave rise to the dispute. 
 In Weber, the dispute clearly arose out of the operation of the 
collective agreement. It was basically a dispute about sick-leave, 
which became encumbered with an incidental claim for trespass. In 
these circumstances, the majority of the Court concluded that it fell 
squarely within s. 45 and should be determined exclusively by the 
labour arbitrator. 
 Here, the same cannot be said. Taking the dispute in its factual 
context, as Weber instructs, the main fact that animates the dispute 
between the parties is that the collective agreement contains a term 
that treats the complainants and members of their group — those 
teachers who had not yet attained the highest level of the pay scale 
who were typically younger and less experienced — less favourably 
than more senior teachers.39
The discussions of both the majority and the dissent lead one to ask 
about the guideposts that should be used to help discern the essential 
character of a matter. Justice Bastarache’s description of the facts goes 
as far as to include the remedies sought, while McLachlin C.J.’s inter-
pretation of the factual matrix sticks very closely to the incidents that 
occurred. Is one approach more acceptable than another? Should there 
be limitations to what constitutes facts? Given the malleability of the 
findings regarding essential character seen in Morin, as well as in Cha-
rette and Vaid discussed below, one wonders if such determinations are 
being made most effectively through primary reliance on the test for 
essential character as it currently exists.  
(C) INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO LABOUR ARBITRATION  
Justice Bastarache, in dissent, held that every collective agreement 
implicitly incorporates the substantive human rights and obligations 
provided by human rights legislation. This principle is drawn from 
Parry Sound. Justice Bastarache noted that not only are human rights 
and obligations incorporated implicitly into all collective agreements but 
that in this case, the rights and obligations guaranteed by the Quebec 
Charter had actually been expressly incorporated into the collective 
                                                                                                                                
39 Morin, id., at paras. 21-23. 
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agreement.40 As a consequence, Bastarache J. held that even if the dis-
pute’s essential character was found to be a human rights issue in this 
case, it still should have been rightfully addressed through arbitration. 
Justice Bastarache finished his judgment by offering a set of primar-
ily policy-based reasons for courts to find that labour arbitrators should 
take on, as often as possible, human rights matters that are incidental to 
their mandate. He indicated that we need a single entity to address all 
issues because it fosters the development of a general culture of respect 
for human rights in Quebec’s administrative system. In his view, such 
an approach is consistent with the will of the Quebec legislature, which 
has not made jurisdiction over human rights matters exclusive to the 
Human Rights Tribunal. Having arbitrators decide incidental human 
rights matters is also logical, as the arbitrator will be in a good position 
to make determinations that take a holistic view of the repercussions for 
the rest of the collective agreement. Finally, in addition to reducing the 
difficulties of deciding when matters should be removed to another 
forum, exclusive jurisdiction avoids causing violence to the comprehen-
sive statutory scheme created to govern labour matters and works to 
ensure that citizens can have Charter issues resolved in a prompt, inex-
pensive and informal way. 
The value of having administrative bodies other than human rights 
tribunals decide incidental human rights matters in the course of their 
mandated work is a theme that Bastarache J. developed further in the 
companion case of Charette. 
(b) Charette 
Ms. Charette was a recipient of a social assistance benefit provided 
to low income families with children. This benefit was provided through 
the Parental Wage Assistance Program established under the Act re-
specting income security41 and administered by the responsible Minister. 
Conditions for obtaining the benefit included that the applicant be re-
ceiving income from employment. Ms. Charette became pregnant and 
                                                                                                                                
40 The collective agreement incorporated the right of teachers to the full and equal exercise 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Quebec Charter. See Morin, id., at para. 66.  
41 R.S.Q. c. S-3.1.1, replaced on October 1, 1999 with the Act respecting income support, 
employment assistance and social solidarity, R.S.Q. c. S-32.001 [hereinafter “the Act”, “Income 
Security Act”]. 
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took maternity leave. During her leave, the Minister discontinued her 
benefits. She was told that the employment insurance that she would 
receive during her maternity leave did not constitute the employment 
income required to qualify her for the Parental Wage Assistance Pro-
gram. Under the Act, Ms. Charette had the right to challenge the Minis-
ter’s decision at the Commission des affaires sociales (“CAS”) (now 
part of the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec (“ATQ”)). Instead of 
doing so, she lodged a complaint at the Quebec Human Rights Commis-
sion alleging that the Parental Wage Assistance Program discriminated 
against women, particularly pregnant women, in violation of sections 10 
and 12 of the Quebec Charter. The Commission then referred her com-
plaint to the Human Rights Tribunal. 
The Attorney General of Quebec brought a motion before the Hu-
man Rights Tribunal asking it to decline to hear the matter on the 
ground that the CAS held exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The 
Human Rights Tribunal rejected the motion42 and the Attorney General’s 
requests for judicial review and suspension of the Tribunal’s proceed-
ings were rejected by the Superior Court.43 However, the Quebec Court 
of Appeal reversed these orders.44 It held that the CAS had exclusive 
jurisdiction and that Ms. Charette’s only recourse was to ask for review 
under the administrative scheme provided in the Act.45 The issues raised 
before the Supreme Court, therefore, were the narrow question of de-
termining which administrative body the legislature intended to resolve 
Ms. Charette’s claim and the broader issue of the appropriate method to 
be used to analyze cases in which there are potential conflicts of juris-
diction among administrative schemes. Unlike the case in Morin, the 
Court found here that the Commission des affaires sociales, not the 
Human Rights Tribunal, had jurisdiction over the question of discrimi-
nation. Given the vastly different results in two cases that both allege 
discrimination, the Supreme Court’s method of analysis in addressing 
issues of jurisdiction ratione materiae becomes particularly interesting. 
                                                                                                                                
42 [2000] J.T.D.P.Q. no. 6. 
43 [2000] Q.J. no. 5646. 
44 [2002] J.Q. no. 369, [2002] R.J.Q. 583. 
45 The Court of Appeal also added that if her request before the CAS should fail she would 
not have the option of later making a complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal. In other words, the 
CAS’ remedy was the sole remedy available. 
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The Supreme Court was far from unanimous in its result. The ma-
jority decision to dismiss the appeal in this case was split with separate 
concurring reasons by two sets of two justices each. Justices Bastarache 
and Arbour form one group; Binnie and Fish JJ. form the other. Justice 
Bastarache and Binnie J. are the respective authors. There is also a dis-
sent by McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci and Major JJ., penned by McLachlin 
C.J. 
(i) The Dissent 
(A) CHIEF JUSTICE MCLACHLIN, IACOBUCCI AND MAJOR JJ. 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache J. have switched roles in 
this case, with Bastarache J. in the majority and the Chief Justice dis-
senting. As well, sounding unusually like Bastarache J. in his dissent in 
Morin, McLachlin C.J. framed the issue in Charette as being “whether 
the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal is deprived of jurisdiction to decide 
an issue of alleged discrimination, on the ground that the legislature has 
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on a different tribunal…the Commis-
sion des affaires socials.”46 She repeated this issue as being a question of 
the possible ousting of the jurisdiction of the Quebec Human Rights 
Tribunal because exclusive jurisdiction had been conferred on the 
CAS.47 Curiously, although the Chief Justice parted company with Bas-
tarache J. in Morin for starting his analysis from a presumption of juris-
dictional exclusivity on the part of one deciding body, here her approach 
is not far from his. That is to say that, in lieu of analyzing the essential 
character of the facts of the case and then determining which decision-
making body the legislature intended to decide the dispute, she pre-
sumed, by the nature of the claim (i.e., discrimination) that the Human 
Rights Tribunal had jurisdiction (albeit not exclusive) and that the ques-
tion was to determine if its jurisdiction was to be removed. 
Chief Justice McLachlin continued with the notion of three possible 
jurisdictional models that she had asserted in Morin. In her opinion, the 
question was which of the three Weber models had been chosen by the 
legislature. To decide this, one must consider the legislation and the 
essential nature of the dispute in its factual context. Examining the legis-
                                                                                                                                
46 Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 1 (emphasis added). 
47 Id., at para. 5. 
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lation and the nature of the dispute should ensure two things: consis-
tency with the legislative regimes and that the tribunal with the best fit 
will have jurisdiction.  
Upon examining the Income Security Act and the CAS Act, 
McLachlin C.J. determined that the jurisdictional model chosen by the 
legislature was exclusive as opposed to overlapping or concurrent. The 
CAS had exclusive jurisdiction to hear contestations of ministerial deci-
sions relating to income security. She also found that the CAS had the 
power to interpret and apply the Charter (presumably based on its ability 
to decide questions of law coupled with a strong privative clause) al-
though it had no expertise in human rights matters.  
As for the essential character of the dispute, the Chief Justice as-
serted that we must look at whether “the dispute, viewed in its factual 
matrix and not formalistically” is one over which the legislature in-
tended the CAS to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction. In her view, Ms. 
Charette’s claim dealt essentially with discrimination. She provided 
three reasons to support her conclusion. First, to characterize Ms. 
Charette’s claim as simply a claim for benefits under the Income Secu-
rity Act as the Attorney General had done eliminated the essence of the 
claim, which is that the Act and the Parental Wage Assistance Program 
violated the equality rights guaranteed by the Charter. Second, the 
collective aspect of Ms. Charette’s complaint would be lost if it was 
viewed as a claim for benefits. The complainant was seeking a declara-
tion not only in respect to the violation of her own equality rights but 
also in respect to the rights of all pregnant women treated in the same 
way. Finally, the significance of the claim would be diminished if it 
had been treated simply as a claim for benefits. Viewed as such, the 
implication was that the complaint dealt with the improper application 
of the law instead of with the validity of the law itself. Chief Justice 
McLachlin also made an analogy with Morin, pointing out that as in 
Morin, there was no dispute over the way in which the benefits pro-
gram was interpreted or applied. The true dispute was over the validity 
of the program itself. In McLachlin C.J.’s opinion, while the Income 
Security Act gave exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from rulings on 
security benefits, it did not give it jurisdiction over a matter that in its 
essential nature, was about gender discrimination. This was a matter 
for the Human Rights Tribunal. In McLachlin C.J.’s words: “The In-
come Security Act does not give the CAS exclusive jurisdiction over a 
dispute that, viewed in its full factual matrix, is essentially a human 
rights claim about the validity of a law that affects Ms. Charette and 
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many others in her situation.”48 Repeating the stance that she took in 
Morin, McLachlin C.J. added that the Human Rights Tribunal was the 
best fit for this dispute.49
(ii) The Majority 
(A) JUSTICES BASTARACHE AND ARBOUR 
Writing for himself and Arbour J., Bastarache J. saw the issue in 
this case as dealing with the essential character of a dispute. More spe-
cifically, the issue concerned “the manner of determining the essential 
character of a dispute when, at first glance, there appear to be two ad-
ministrative bodies that could claim jurisdiction over the matter, but one 
… has an exclusivity clause in its enabling statute.”50 It is interesting 
that his focus was on developing the correct approach to questions of 
jurisdiction. Certainly this is a helpful step in providing guidance for 
administrative bodies and lower courts that will have to grapple with 
these issues in the future. 
Justice Bastarache’s approach is very similar to the one he took in 
Morin and he once again expressed disagreement with McLachlin C.J. 
over many of the same concerns. In particular, he believed that McLach-
lin C.J.’s analysis of the essential character had been largely influenced 
by the legal characterization of Ms. Charette’s claim. He also did not 
agree that the possibility of a human rights violation should have re-
sulted in setting aside the CAS’s exclusive jurisdiction. Picking up on a 
theme he had started to develop in Morin, Bastarache J. reminded us 
that tribunals that can determine matters of law also have the ability to 
determine Charter matters unless the legislature indicates otherwise. 
Relying on Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; 
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur,51 Bastarache J. 
asserted that the CAS should have the power to declare the Minister’s 
decision discriminatory and any provision of the Income Security Act 
that contravenes the Charter to be of no force or effect. 
                                                                                                                                
48 Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 18. 
49 She also observed that there would be no duplication of work (Charette, id., at para. 20). 
Although McLachlin C.J. was not explicit on which of the models would exist, it seems that this 
would be one of overlapping jurisdiction.  
50 Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 22. 
51 [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 [hereinafter “Martin/Laseur”]. 
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As he did in Morin, Bastarache J. again insisted that all aspects of a 
dispute should be decided in one forum. Many of the policy concerns he 
expressed in the last part of Morin, resurface more forcefully in Cha-
rette. He stressed that the resolution of a Charter question related to a 
legislative scheme requires a thorough understanding of the objectives 
of the scheme and of the practical implications of proposed remedies.52 
The expertise of the tribunal in dealing with the administration of the 
Act is undoubtedly useful in resolving Charter matters. Moreover, when 
it comes to the Quebec Charter, Bastarache J. asserted, both in Morin 
and here in Charette, that the Quebec legislature “has stipulated that 
administrative bodies not specializing in human rights nevertheless have 
a duty to enforce those rights in their decisions.”53 The goal of the legis-
lature was to foster a general culture of respect for human rights 
throughout Quebec’s entire administrative system. Lastly, he pointed to 
the additional policy reason of making the Charter meaningful and ac-
cessible by having tribunals conform to it in their decision-making.  
Justice Bastarache was not explicit on how he reached this conclu-
sion about the legislated obligation imposed on administrative bodies 
other than the Human Rights Tribunal to enforce human rights. He did 
not make reference to any explicit stipulation in the Quebec Charter. 
Based on an overall reading of his reasons, however, it may simply be 
that Bastarache J. derived this obligation from the power given to many 
tribunals to decide all questions of law, a power which was confirmed 
last term in Martin/Laseur to incorporate the power to decide constitu-
tional questions as well.54 Interestingly, he made no express reference to 
the fact that he was expanding the case law by applying the principles of 
Martin/Laseur so that they dealt with not only constitutional but also 
with quasi-constitutional enactments. He also did not discuss the under-
lying principles that he relied on to make this expansion.55 As a result, 
there has been a seamless transferral of the principles established in 
                                                                                                                                
52 Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 27. 
53 Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 28; See also Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 68.  
54 See Martin/Laseur, supra, note 51. 
55 The expansion was very likely based on the idea that quasi-constitutional enactments of-
ten also signal their primacy over other legislation enacted in their jurisdiction. The Quebec Charter 
at s. 52, for example, prohibits derogation from it unless done expressly. See also the decision of 
Lamer J. (as he then was) in Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 
145 [hereinafter “Heerspink”] where he expressed this idea as judicial principle. 
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Martin/Laseur for constitutional questions to the realm of quasi-
constitutional questions as well.56
Finally, Bastarache J. noted that the Human Rights Tribunal would 
have ended up making an order on the legality of the Minister’s decision 
about benefits and may have potentially substituted its own decision. 
Such actions would certainly violate the integrity of the established 
legislative scheme.  
Justice Bastarache concluded that the dispute essentially dealt with 
Ms. Charette’s eligibility for the Parental Wage Assistance program and 
was a matter that fit within the explicit mandate of the CAS. Unlike 
McLachlin C.J., the fact that the claim may affect a group instead of 
only one person was of minimal importance to Bastarache J. In his opin-
ion, this fact did not serve to alter the essential nature of the dispute. 
Moreover, in past cases in which the Court had found exclusive jurisdic-
tion, such as Weber and Parry Sound, the collective aspect was no less 
present. 
Integrated decision-making is obviously an important and central 
concern to Bastarache J. in his decisions on jurisdiction. It will be inter-
esting to see if he manages to push it further by capturing more of the 
support of the Court in future cases. It will also be interesting to see if 
integrated decision-making will be limited to instances where the inci-
dental matter to be decided by the administrative body is a constitutional 
or quasi-constitutional right or if incidental matters in other subject 
areas will figure in future debates as well.57  
(B) JUSTICES BINNIE AND FISH 
Justice Binnie provided yet a third perspective on the issue pre-
sented in Charette. More similar in nature to Bastarache J.’s percep-
tion of the issue than to that of McLachlin C.J., Binnie J. held that the 
task before the Court was twofold. On the one hand, the Court had to 
                                                                                                                                
56 This transferral has been adopted in later Supreme Court decisions of the 2004-2005 
term and has already been picked up by lower courts. See for example, the Court’s analysis in 
Okwuobi and Vaid decided this term and discussed below. See also the Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision in Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2004] O.J. No. 
3724, 72 O.R. (3d) 457 [hereinafter “Tranchemontagne”]. 
57 On the question of integrated decision-making of a human rights matter see 
Tranchemontagne, id., which was decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal shortly after Morin and 
Charette were released. This case is scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court during the 2005-
2006 term. 
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examine two legislative schemes to determine which of the potential 
adjudicative bodies the legislature intended to resolve Ms. Charette’s 
claim. If more than one adjudicative body had a claim to jurisdiction, 
then the Court had to determine also how this conflict of jurisdictions 
should be be resolved.58 Like Bastarache J., Binnie J. is interested in 
the appropriate method of analysis to resolve jurisdictional conflict. 
His focus was on discerning the intention of the legislature. He be-
lieved the dissenting judges chose the correct test but erred by allow-
ing their evaluation of the essential nature of the dispute to trump the 
legislature’s clear intention to have income security benefits deter-
mined by the CAS. 
Justice Binnie held that it was important to separate the factual and 
legal contexts in which the dispute arose from the legal character of the 
alleged wrong. It is the legislative and factual contexts, “not the legal 
character of the alleged wrong, that is crucial to the allocation of juris-
diction.”59 In Binnie J.’s opinion, the facts that gave rise to this dispute 
were the Minister’s discontinuance of an income security benefit and 
“Ms. Charette’s claim to get it back under an administrative scheme that 
the legislature in plain words has channelled directly to the CAS.”60 He 
had no difficulty in defining the essential character of the dispute. He 
noted that the legal wrong in this case could be characterized as a Char-
ter complaint but that this should not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that the Human Rights Tribunal had jurisdiction over the matter.  
Justice Binnie focused on the fact that there was a clearly estab-
lished administrative appeal route set out by the legislature. Pointing to 
the statute, he observed that the legislature had indicated the appeal 
route to be exclusive and that, where there are intended exceptions to 
this exclusivity, the legislature signalled those explicitly.61 It is clear that 
the legislature intended the CAS to have exclusive jurisdiction over 
disagreements like the one concerning Ms. Charette’s discontinued 
benefits. Moreover, Binnie J. criticized McLachlin C.J. for outlining and 
relying on what he saw as several policy considerations favouring the 
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Tribunal. In his opinion, the legislature 
had already designated a forum and it was for the courts to respect that 
                                                                                                                                
58 Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 35. 
59 Id., at para. 37. 
60 Id.  
61 Id., at para. 39. 
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choice. Later in his reasons, he reiterated his views on the importance of 
respecting the separation of powers when he held that it was irrelevant 
that Ms. Charette’s claim had the potential to affect many others. Justice 
Binnie noted that this was a factor endemic to all Charter claims and 
undoubtedly, one that the Quebec legislature took into account when it 
decided to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS.62
Finally, Binnie J. offered an interesting analysis of the differences 
between Morin and Charette. His comments highlight why, in his view, 
the Human Rights Tribunal was determined to possess jurisdiction ra-
tione materiae in Morin, but not in Charette. Justice Binnie provided 
several reasons. He recalled, first, that in Morin, the nature of the dis-
pute could not be characterized as a grievance under the collective 
agreement (it dealt with negotiation of the agreement itself), whereas 
Ms. Charette’s claim fell clearly under the Income Security Act and the 
CAS was competent to deal with it. Secondly, he noted the absence of a 
conflict of interest in this case. In Morin, the Court held that the union 
that the complainant would approach to bring her grievance may be 
opposed in interest and disinclined to do so. There was no case of con-
flict in Charette. Justice Binnie also noted that the CAS had jurisdiction 
over all the relevant parties in Charette, whereas in Morin the grievance 
arbitrator did not. For his final point, Binnie J. indicated that a collective 
element is present in all Charter claims. This element will always mili-
tate toward a finding that the Human Rights regime is most appropriate. 
However, Binnie J. noted that the Quebec legislature likely took this 
into account in deciding to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS. 
Justice Binnie held: 
Fourth, while the dispute here potentially affects many individuals 
other than Ms. Charette, as was the case in Morin and is a 
characteristic of Charter claims generally, this factor will always 
favour the Commission or a Human Rights Tribunal in turf wars with 
other branches of the provincial government. It is a factor which the 
Quebec legislature inevitably took into account when it gave exclusive 
jurisdiction over income security benefits to the CAS including the 
power to adjudicate Charter arguments (subject to judicial review by 
the ordinary courts).63
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This final point is perplexing and does not seem to support his thesis 
at all that there are differences that generated the results in Morin and 
Charette. It may be that Binnie J. was indicating that there is greater 
room to consider the collective aspect of a claim, a factor which points 
toward the jurisdiction of a human rights tribunal, when the competing 
adjudicative body is not a branch of provincial government. If so, that is 
a strange comment to make as it goes against his own finding in Cha-
rette. It is also unclear why such a distinction should be made. Presuma-
bly, the potential for conflict with the Human Rights Tribunal, if indeed 
thought through systematically at the stage of legislative development, 
would have been considered for all decision-making bodies designed by 
the provincial legislature, whether a branch of provincial government or 
not. A question that may be worth further exploration in the competing 
jurisdiction cases, however, is whether the legislature indeed anticipated 
and thought through such conflicts at the time of drafting the relevant 
pieces of legislation. 
The cases dealing with jurisdiction have thus far dealt with the Que-
bec human rights regime and its interplay with other legislative schemes 
within the Quebec administrative law system. Two additional cases 
addressing the question of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction were 
also decided last term: Vaid and Okwuobi. The next case, Vaid, is inter-
esting because of its very unencumbered treatment of the jurisdictional 
question. It also provides a further glimpse of the Court’s treatment of 
quasi-constitutional, human rights legislation. 
(c) Vaid 
Vaid is a case with constitutional law, administrative law and human 
rights dimensions. Mr. Vaid was a chauffeur to the Speaker of the 
House of Commons. He believed he had been constructively dismissed 
for reasons of discrimination and harassment and lodged a complaint 
with the Canadian Human Rights Commission. The House of Commons 
and the Speaker raised a preliminary objection, arguing that Parliamen-
tary privilege allowed the Senate and the House of Commons to conduct 
their employee relations free from interference from the Canadian Hu-
man Rights Commission or any other body outside Parliament itself. A 
large portion of the Supreme Court’s judgment was therefore devoted to 
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the constitutional question of whether the parliamentary privilege 
claimed could be said to exist.64 The Supreme Court decision was unani-
mous. Justice Binnie, writing for the Court, held that the privilege 
claimed did not exist and that the appellants could not succeed on that 
ground. He then moved on to address the administrative law issue. Spe-
cifically, this was the question of whether the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission and Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Vaid’s complaint 
of harassment and discrimination or whether his complaint was a matter 
for the grievance process established under the Parliamentary Employ-
ment and Staff Relations Act.65
Examining the relevant statutory provisions of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act,66 Binnie J. first addressed the question of whether Parliamen-
tary employees fell within the application of the Act. With reference to 
modern principles of statutory interpretation which require, among other 
things, that legislation be given fair, large and liberal construction to 
ensure that it attain its goals,67 principles which Binnie J. asserted apply 
with special force in the application of human rights laws,68 Binnie J. 
held that the Human Rights Act applied to employees of Parliament. In 
his view, it was not necessary for the Act to indicate expressly that Par-
liamentary employees are included within the scope of its application; it 
is simply enough that the language of the statute show no indication that 
it intends to exclude them from it. 
Justice Binnie then examined the question of whether Mr. Vaid’s 
claim was within PESRA’s exclusive authority. He found that the com-
plaint was essentially just a grievance raising a human rights issue and 
that PESRA’s exclusivity clause69 ousted the jurisdiction of the bodies 
established under the Canadian Human Rights Act.  
                                                                                                                                
 
64 The Human Rights Tribunal held that they did possess jurisdiction over the matter. On 
judicial review, the Federal Court, Trial Division, upheld the decision of the Human Rights Tribu-
nal. On further appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the decision was affirmed. (See Vaid v. 
Canada (House of Commons), [2001] C.H.R.D. No. 15, affd [2001] F.C.J. No. 1818, [2002] 2. F.C. 
583 (T.D.), affd [2002] F.C.J. No. 1663, [2003] 1 F.C. 602 (C.A.)). 
65 R.S.C. 1985, c. 33 (2nd Supp.) [hereinafter “PESRA”]. 
66 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
67 Justice Binnie relied on the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12; Bell Ex-
pressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; R. v. Sharpe, 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 and Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1983). See Vaid, supra, note 3, at para. 80. 
68 Vaid, id., at para. 80. 
69 This clause, PESRA, s. 2, reads: 
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As with the two cases emanating from Quebec, it is extremely fas-
cinating to note how the jurisdictional issue was resolved in this deci-
sion. The Court took the test for competing jurisdiction from McLachlin 
C.J. in Morin: 
[…]the question in each case is whether the relevant legislation 
applied to the dispute at issue, taken in its full factual context, 
established that the labour arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
dispute.70  
But the problem with this formulation of the test is that it does not 
present a symmetrical approach to determining the question. In its pur-
est form, a general approach to competing jurisdictions, whether involv-
ing a labour dispute or not, should simply be to examine which of two 
or more decision-making bodies was intended to have jurisdiction, given 
that the three models exist. The McLachlin formulation in Morin was 
given as more of a réplique to Bastarache J.’s idea of exclusivity than a 
general approach. Exclusivity on the part of one decision-making body, 
whether explicit or presumed, will not always be a factor to consider in 
the analysis. 
As well, the essential nature of the dispute was not a contentious is-
sue at all in this case. The Court had no difficulty classifying Mr. Vaid’s 
complaint as a workplace complaint that raised an incidental human 
rights issue. One reason for this ease of classification stemmed from the 
ability to compare this case to the facts of Morin and Charette, which 
were also human rights cases. As the test and process of analysis have 
not gotten any easier, however, it would not be surprising for divisions 
in the court to arise again in future cases. As Binnie J. observes: “[t]his 
is not an area of the law that lends itself to overgeneralization.”71  
A curious aspect of the case is that the facts giving rise to the dis-
pute are taken from the complaint filed by Mr. Vaid at the Human 
Rights Commission. It is probably anomalous that the complainant’s 
facts were written in such a way as to lead him away from being granted 
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force or effect in relation to the institutions and persons described in this section. 
70 Vaid, supra, note 3, at para. 92, citing McLachlin C.J. in Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 14. 
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the forum of his choice. But, certainly this is a reminder to litigants to 
do as much as possible to present the facts in a way that will appeal to 
the court to grant them the forum desired.  
Finally, the analysis in Vaid raises a couple of additional points for 
reflection. Firstly, the Court’s holding indicates implicitly that the word-
ing in section 2 of PESRA is sufficient to displace the requirements of 
quasi-constitutional, human rights legislation. The Court did not discuss 
the matter directly. However, it noted from cases like Heerspink that 
“express and unequivocal language”72 to the contrary is necessary to be 
certain of the legislature’s intent that a human rights enactment is not to 
supersede all other laws. Secondly, Vaid is the last of three cases on 
competing forum this term, all of which involved one body with express 
or implied exclusivity. It will be interesting to see how the Court’s ap-
proach changes, if at all, when faced with two bodies possessing concur-
rent jurisdiction.  
(d) Determining Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae — Reflections  
Almost immediately upon reading Morin, Charette and Vaid one 
notes that the Court has struggled in defining the test to be applied and, 
by extension, the method of analysis for determining the legislator’s 
intention for the applicable forum. Perhaps the cases on exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction can be classified as a struggle for the best way to 
determine legislative intent. A few approaches have emerged from the 
cases this term. In some instances, it seems that the judges look for an 
indication that the legislature intended to remove the matter at hand 
from the body that on its face would appear seized of it. This is the 
approach taken by Bastarache J. in Morin and Charette and to a large 
extent also McLachlin C.J. in her dissenting opinion in Charette. Other 
approaches are more neutral. In Morin, we see the Chief Justice propose 
that the relevant legislation and the facts be examined to determine the 
nature of the jurisdiction — exclusive, concurrent or overlapping — the 
legislature intended for the particular dispute (although arguably this is 
not the approach she actually uses). There are to be no presuppositions 
about the existence of exclusivity or other models of jurisdiction simply 
because of past jurisprudence or the wording of the statute alone. Justice 
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Binnie also presents a more neutral, balanced approach. Faced with 
conflicting jurisdictions, he asked simply which body the legislature 
intended to resolve the dispute. In Charette and Vaid, for example, he 
focused primarily on the language of the statute without becoming too 
encumbered in defining the essential character of the dispute.  
But mixed in with these approaches are more normatively driven 
policy perspectives held by some that interfere, rightly or wrongly, with 
the pure pursuit of legislative intent. An example is to have all matters 
arising from one dispute decided in one place; another is the belief that 
widespread, collective remedies are best-suited for human rights viola-
tions. Justice Bastarache, for example, is a strong supporter of the idea 
that tribunals have the right to decide human rights matters either under 
the power conferred by Parry Sound or by the principles derived from 
Martin/Laseur giving tribunals Charter jurisdiction.  
This mixture of legislative intent and policy represents a tension be-
tween two values that have become central in the administrative state. 
Essentially, this is a contest between expertise and expediency and 
based on these cases, it is a contest in which expediency often wins. One 
cannot help but experience difficulty in deciding who is correct in cases 
like Morin and Charette, as evidenced by the many divides in the deci-
sions themselves. Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach to the problems 
before her emphasizes the importance of valuing specialized bodies for 
the expertise they can bring to the matter and for their capacity to fash-
ion appropriate remedies — for example, the ability of human rights 
tribunals to fashion systemic remedies. Her reasoning implies that it is 
because of their expertise that the legislature has created these bodies 
and that we should turn to them to provide the most suitable remedy. In 
this way, deference is shown to the will of the legislature in the larger 
sense of the term. It is not just that the words of two enabling statutes 
are examined to determine legislative intent; deference is shown to the 
fact that the legislature has designed an overall set of bodies, each with 
its own area of expertise and function within the administrative state. 
Given that expertise is a hallmark of tribunal existence — one of the 
reasons that tribunals were often created73 and certainly, as articulated 
by the Supreme Court, the most important reason for which deference 
should be granted to a tribunal in determining the appropriate standard 
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of review74 — there is a very strong basis for the legitimacy of this ap-
proach. 
The opposing view tends to see more value in expediency. We 
know that the administrative justice system has been designed to pro-
vide inexpensive, faster, efficient results for the litigant.75 Requiring an 
individual to go to more than one tribunal to have a dispute settled 
seems contrary to these goals. These ideas are reflected in the decisions 
rendered by Bastarache J. Yet, it is difficult to conceive of speed and 
convenience as goals more worthy of pursuit than providing experience 
and expertise in decisions rendered. Such a perspective overlooks the 
qualitative value of the tribunals themselves. It is not just quick, conven-
ient resolutions that the individual litigant seeks, but the most appropri-
ate resolution possible to a specific problem. This leads to a final point 
in the debate between expertise and expediency: the role of the individ-
ual in the battle over jurisdictional conflict. It seems unusual that not 
much emphasis has been placed on the desire of the litigant to have his 
or her dispute heard in a particular forum. We have seen how difficult it 
is to find the one essential character of a dispute. Cases like Morin and 
Charette simply reinforce that a dispute often has a multiplicity of char-
acter rather than one essential character. In such situations, one would 
think that the individual litigant’s way of seeing the dispute would be 
useful to determining the correct forum. Questions about jurisdictional 
conflict are not about disputes and legislative will in the abstract. They 
are disputes over something that has happened to an individual about 
which the individual would like to complain in a specific way. It may be 
a personal matter, as in a workplace disagreement, or it may be a matter 
for which the main point of complaining is to prevent the same thing 
from happening to others, such as in a case of alleged discrimination. If 
more than one fora are possible, the courts cannot simply redesign the 
facts to fit into one forum or the other. The search for essential character 
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must be anchored in the litigant’s view, otherwise the essence of the 
dispute risks being diminished. This is McLachlin C.J.’s point in Cha-
rette. One could also take the point further and note that to redesign the 
dispute in such a way not only risks diminishing the dispute, it also risks 
disempowering the litigant.  
On a practical level, as these problems work themselves out, ques-
tions remain regarding how a litigant is to know which tribunal is the 
correct one to address his or her concern. Tribunal decision-makers are 
also sure to be concerned over the challenge of making correct first-
level decisions to accept or decline jurisdiction. With all the separate 
concurring reasons and various approaches, the law on the question of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae offers support for many diverging proposi-
tions, making the law uncertain both in the jurisprudence and as a prac-
tical reality for tribunal members and users. 
From a theoretical and policy perspective, we have seen a shift in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, highlighted in other cases as well, 
like Ocean Port, in which the Court has emphasized the will of the 
legislature. However, at the same time, one does not hear much talk of 
empirical evidence that the creation of tribunals across any level of 
government has been done in a systematic way, with emphasis on avoid-
ing conflicts. The exclusive jurisdiction jurisprudence may be seen as a 
call to legislators and policy-makers to dedicate more attention to fore-
seeing problems of jurisdictional conflict and to be clearer in identifying 
legislative intent. More unification in the legislative process may be 
necessary. Finally, the notion of “jurisdictional analysis” began its de-
cline with the line of cases starting with Bibeault76 which introduced a 
pragmatic and functional approach and touted the importance of dis-
cerning legislative intent. It is somewhat of a paradox that today, in the 
process of searching for legislative intent, we have once again entered a 
strong debate over matters of jurisdiction.  
With the next case, Okwuobi, we move further along the spectrum 
of jurisdictional interaction. At this point, we are moving away from 
conflicts between administrative regimes to revisit the question of the 
appropriate balance of judicial intervention and restraint in the interac-
tion between courts and tribunals. 
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2. Residual Remedial Jurisdiction of the Courts: Okwuobi 
Okwuobi forms part of a trilogy of cases in which the Court deter-
mined whether a provision of the Quebec Charter of the French lan-
guage77 violated the rights to equality guaranteed by the Charter of 
human rights and freedoms78 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.79 While the trilogy predominantly addresses constitutional 
law issues,80 Okwuobi, the third case in the series, examines the ability 
of the superior courts to supplement the jurisdiction of an administrative 
body that has been given exclusive authority over a matter but may not 
be able to provide the remedy sought. The case is significant because it 
provides guiding principles for determining when a superior court can 
intervene to provide injunctive relief and hear direct constitutional chal-
lenges. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court’s guidance is 
extremely vague, leaving the judgment somewhat disappointing. The 
holding in Okwuobi was that supplementary remedial assistance was not 
required from the Court. The facts of Okwuobi, therefore, do not enable 
us to glean a picture of precise situations when supplementary remedial 
jurisdiction will be granted. The Court also offered no examples. As a 
result, we must wait and see how the question will be handled by the 
lower courts and whether the Supreme Court will ultimately approve. 
The decision in Okwuobi comprises an appeal by three appellants, 
heard jointly at the Supreme Court. As mentioned, it is a case dealing with 
entitlement to minority language education in Quebec. After the Minister 
of Education denied English language instruction to the children of the 
appellants, each applied to the Superior Court for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief on the grounds that the Charter of the French language violated 
the Canadian Charter. In taking this route, the appellants bypassed the 
administrative appeal process that had been established under the Act 
respecting administrative justice.81 For two of the appellants, the Superior 
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Court declined to hear the matter, holding that the ATQ had exclusive 
jurisdiction over their appeals. These judgments were upheld at the Court 
of Appeal. In the case of the third appellant, the Superior Court held that it 
possessed jurisdiction over the matter. At the Court of Appeal, this deci-
sion was reversed.  
The Supreme Court held that the ATQ had exclusive jurisdiction 
over appeals from decisions regarding eligibility for minority language 
instruction. The Court also relied on Martin/Laseur and Paul to con-
clude that the ATQ’s explicit power to decide questions of law empow-
ered it to consider incidental constitutional questions. The Court held 
that the claimants could not circumvent the administrative appeal proc-
ess set up through the ATQ. The legislature intended the ATQ’s juris-
diction to be exclusive and courts should respect the intention of the 
legislature. The appellants had argued that the ATQ did not have juris-
diction over all the parties and that it could grant neither an injunction 
nor a declaration of constitutional invalidity. The Court found, by con-
trast, that the ATQ had express authority to implead parties necessary 
for complete resolution of the dispute. It also noted that the ATQ had 
been granted broad remedial powers under its enabling statute that may 
have the potential to be used in a manner similar to a formal injunction. 
The only remedy sought that the ATQ could not grant was a declaration. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that absence of this remedy was not a rea-
son to circumvent the administrative process. In the Court’s opinion, 
judicial review is always available and the party can seek a declaration 
at that time. 
A principle that emerges from this case is that a litigant does not 
have the right to bypass an administrative scheme simply because the 
scheme does not provide a remedy sought. This is an admonition to both 
litigants and courts. The Supreme Court emphasized its opinion that 
courts must respect the intention of the legislature. Throughout the deci-
sion, one finds a related and equally strong theme — namely, that the 
courts should not use their powers to weaken the administrative process, 
but only to complement it. Consequently, we see that with respect to 
providing injunctive relief, the Court held that judicial discretion to do 
so should only be exercised to “fill in the cracks in the administrative 
process.”82 Recourse to urgent injunctive relief should remain a rare 
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exception and should not be used to avoid a tribunal’s exclusive juris-
diction or to obtain a review of its decision.83
Similarly, with respect to the ability of superior courts to entertain 
direct constitutional challenges, the Court held that the superior courts 
should only act when required to “fill the remedial vacuum.”84 Superior 
courts possess inherent jurisdiction to ensure that there is adherence to 
the Constitution. Their remedial function is therefore particularly perti-
nent when dealing with constitutional remedies. However, superior 
courts should play a role in providing remedies only in situations where 
the legislature has endowed an administrative body with the power to 
decide constitutional questions but not the power to grant the most ap-
propriate and just remedy. It is only in such situations that the superior 
courts can step in. Okwuobi was not such a case. Unfortunately, the 
Court does not go further in describing the situations in which a direct 
application to the superior court for constitutional remedy would be 
acceptable. All the Court says for certain is that it would not be one in 
which the applicants were trying to bypass the administrative scheme 
altogether. How much of a remedy is needed before the superior court 
can step in and how the most appropriate remedy will be determined in 
such cases — for example, whether it will simply be a question of what 
is provided in the courts or whether some aspects of the administrative 
scheme will be incorporated — are questions left for another day.  
On another level, Okwuobi is interesting because the Court is unani-
mous in its analytical approach to the question of jurisdiction. Yet, the 
entire “essential character” test is bypassed, not even mentioned. In its 
place, the only tests applied were those dealing with the constitutional 
jurisdiction of tribunals derived from Martin/Laseur and Paul. It is diffi-
cult to know how to reconcile this with the earlier jurisprudence, as the 
Court has not been clear in distinguishing the situations in which to apply 
the essential character test from those in which to apply the jurisprudence 
dealing with the constitutional jurisdiction of tribunals. One way of rec-
onciling the case law on concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction is to note 
that the question in cases like Okwuobi deal with whether the tribunal in 
fact had the powers necessary to fulfill the mandate given to it in theory. 
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It was clear that the Quebec legislature had granted the ATQ the power to 
determine language entitlement appeals. It was also undisputed that this 
was a language entitlement appeal. The question at issue was whether, in 
the course of deciding such appeals, the ATQ could also decide necessary 
constitutional matters such as the validity under the Charter of provisions 
of the statute it was handling. To answer this question, the Court needed 
only to apply the jurisprudence on the constitutional powers of tribunals: 
namely, Martin/Laseur and Paul. It was not necessary to enter into the 
essential character test in Okwuobi as it had been in previous cases like 
Weber, Morin and Charette, because the debate in Okwuobi was not 
about fitting a dispute within the relatively uncontested powers of a tribu-
nal. This is one possible way of reconciling the approaches taken to ex-
clusive and concurrent jurisdiction; there are undoubtedly others. 
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will take an opportunity to clarify the situa-
tions in which the different tests apply in the near future.  
Finally, Okwuobi is also useful for its in-depth review of the ATQ’s 
powers, structure and, in particular, its overview of the ATQ’s ability to 
deal with Canadian Charter matters. 
III. THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATION: VAUGHAN 
Vaughan is one of those engaging cases that deal with the relationship 
between courts and tribunals. At issue in Vaughan was whether courts 
should show deference to a statutory scheme when that scheme does not 
provide a right to third-party independent adjudication. Decided the same 
month as Okwuobi, Vaughan adds another chapter to the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of when courts should and should not step in to supplement 
dispute resolution processes designed by the legislature. 
Vaughan concerns labour relations and has a very similar feel to We-
ber. Mr. Vaughan was a federal employee who brought an action in neg-
ligence in an effort to have the issue of whether he was entitled to Early 
Retirement Incentive (“ERI”) benefits resolved through independent 
adjudication. Under the Public Service Staff Relations Act85 (“PSSRA”) 
employee benefits were divided into two types. The first type of benefit 
included those negotiated as part of the collective agreement; the second 
included those the government has provided unilaterally by regulation. 
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The Act provided that negotiated benefits were arbitrable while those 
provided unilaterally were grievable but could not go to third-party arbi-
tration. ERI benefits were unilaterally conferred by regulation. For these 
benefits, there was a multi-level internal grievance process which al-
lowed the grievance to be pursued up to the level of the Deputy Minis-
ter. However, the Act did not provide for arbitration after this last level 
of grievance.  
The case before the Supreme Court originated in a preliminary mo-
tion to strike out the action in negligence.86 The motion had been granted 
by a Prothonotary of the Federal Court, who held that the jurisdiction of 
the courts was ousted by the PSSRA’s statutory scheme. This decision 
was then affirmed at all levels of the Federal Court.87 At issue was 
whether the courts should offer a concurrent forum to resolve matters 
relating to unilaterally provided employee benefits because the scheme 
created under the PSSRA did not provide for adjudication of these mat-
ters by an independent third party. The question was therefore one re-
lated to procedural fairness. If an administrative decision-making 
process does not provide the guarantees of procedural fairness required 
at common law and the legislation does not specify that this process is 
to be exclusive, should the lack of procedural fairness be understood as 
an indication that the legislature intended the administrative scheme to 
be concurrent with the courts? 
It was anticipated that the decision in Vaughan would explain the role 
that the right to procedural fairness should play in determining whether 
the legislature has implicitly intended an administrative scheme to have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts. In cases where the enabling legis-
lation does not indicate expressly that an administrative body is to have 
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, it becomes necessary to 
see if such legislative intent can be inferred. Drawing inferences of legis-
lative intent involves, among other things, examining the statute(s) as a 
whole and considering the manner in which the administrative process 
operates in practice. However, at the time that Vaughan arose in the 
courts, the jurisprudence was not clear on how determinative a finding of 
lack of procedural fairness on the part of an administrative scheme should 
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be. The Supreme Court had not yet addressed the question and, as Evans 
J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal noted in his thorough review of pro-
vincial and federal court decisions, the question had not been directly 
addressed by the appellate courts either.88 What was expected by many in 
Vaughan was guidance on a pressing question raised at the Federal Court 
of Appeal — namely, in cases where legislative intent must be inferred, 
should the fact that an administrative scheme does not provide common 
law guarantees of procedural fairness be enough to indicate that exclusive 
jurisdiction was not intended by the legislature? 
Unfortunately, Vaughan did not answer this question. The major-
ity’s holding was that there should be judicial restraint — that is, that 
the courts should defer to the PSSRA grievance procedure in this case. 
The Court’s reasons relied on statutory interpretation but were based 
quite heavily on normative and practical considerations as well. With 
respect to the statute, the Court held that while the language of the 
PSSRA was not strong enough to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, 
courts should nevertheless defer to its grievance process. Without much 
explanation, Binnie J. stated that the statutory language sent a clear 
signal that the decision reached at the end of the grievance process is to 
be final.89 He also noted that the grievance procedure was effective, in 
the sense that it provided a remedy and could be used to resolve the 
particular dispute at issue. On a more normative level, Binnie J. opined 
that courts should not jeopardize the comprehensive dispute resolution 
process contained in the statute by allowing routine access to the 
courts.90 He disagreed with the argument that decision-making schemes 
that do not provide for third-party adjudication are not worthy of defer-
ence. He noted that lack of adjudication is a consideration outweighed 
by greater clues that Parliament intended to create a comprehensive 
scheme. Justice Binnie pointed out as well that Mr. Vaughan’s argument 
implied conflict of interest and bias on the part of the department whose 
officials may have had an interest in denying eligible employees ERI 
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benefits, but that he did not accept this argument.91 Finally, Binnie J. 
outlined two practical reasons why deference should be accorded by the 
courts. The first was that the labour dispute resolution process was faster 
and less costly; the second was that the dispute was straightforward and 
“essentially an administrative matter best left to the administrators.” 
Given the number of federal public service employees, the floodgates of 
litigation could be opened by opening the door to this type of dispute. 
Overall, the majority’s decision is somewhat disappointing — none of 
the reasons presented have much support or delve very deeply into the 
issue. 
Justice Bastarache and McLachlin C.J. formed the dissent in this 
case. In contrast to the majority, they took the general approach that the 
courts “should refrain from preventing access to independent adjudica-
tion in the absence of a clear manifestation of Parliament’s intent in this 
regard.”92 They held that there was concurrent jurisdiction between the 
courts and the grievance system set up under the PSSRA. A particularly 
interesting aspect of their dissent is that they develop and discuss factors 
to consider in determining whether the legislature intended a labour 
dispute resolution process to be exclusive. They concluded: 
In sum, although s. 91 of the PSSRA creates a comprehensive and 
efficient dispute resolution regime, the unavailability of independent 
adjudication, combined with the absence of mandatory language in the 
wording of the statute and lack of expertise of the employer-appointed 
decision maker, points away from a finding of exclusive jurisdiction. 
Consequently, employees should not be precluded from commencing 
an action in the courts.93
Although the dissent listed the unavailability of independent adjudi-
cation, the absence of mandatory language in the wording in the statute 
and lack of expertise of the employer-appointed decision-maker as the 
factors to consider, they also considered others in their analysis. These 
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include the comprehensiveness of the dispute resolution scheme and the 
availability of a remedy. Particularly noteworthy in terms of remedy is 
that the dissenting judges did not find that judicial review was an ade-
quate substitute for independent adjudication of the claims on their 
merits. They also stressed that it is not just the fact of independence in 
the dispute resolution process that is important but that the independent 
decision-maker have expertise. While these factors have been developed 
within the labour context and in dissent, they certainly provide food for 
thought as to the considerations that should be relevant generally in 
establishing which of the three models of jurisdiction (concurrent, over-
lapping or exclusive) the legislature intended when the legislation is not 
explicit. 
At first blush, it is also surprising to find Bastarache J. in the dis-
senting minority in Vaughan. He had unwaveringly defended the con-
cept of the exclusivity of arbitral jurisdiction in Morin and, in Charette, 
had championed the idea of tribunals deciding incidental human rights 
matters in the course of their work in order to keep as many aspects of a 
dispute as possible in one forum. To then support concurrent jurisdiction 
between courts and the federal labour relations regime established for 
public servants seems completely out of step. However, Bastarache J.’s 
apparent change of heart highlights an aspect of his prior arguments that 
had not been obvious. Central to his support for exclusive jurisdiction in 
the labour relations regime is the fact that it promises independent adju-
dication in the form of an expert arbitrator. For Bastarache J., access to 
an independent expert adjudicator is a crucial pre-condition to finding 
deference for structures of labour resolution.94 The dissenting judges 
admit that if the legislature is clear in asserting that it has preferred a 
decision-making system that provides for decision-making without 
third-party adjudication at its culmination then the courts are obliged to 
respect this choice. However, they held that in this case, the statute does 
not present an unequivocal statement to this effect.  
Justice Bastarache’s conclusion casts a pall over the legitimacy of 
such state designed processes, especially since he also implies that judi-
cial review is not a sufficient remedy for processes in which independ-
ent adjudication does not exist. In contrast to Binnie J., his reasoning 
may be interpreted as inferring a perception of bias in such processes. 
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(2005), 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) Administrative Law 81 
 
Finally, one also cannot help but notice the link between this case and 
the recent jurisprudence on the requirements for tribunal independence. 
Vaughan could also be seen as a case regarding the degree of independ-
ence required by a tribunal, in which case the issue would turn on 
whether the legislature was clear in its intention to make a decision-
making process without independent adjudication.95 Indeed, the judges 
who wrote the majority concurring reasons at the Federal Court of Ap-
peal discussed the issue from this perspective and they found that the 
legislation was clear in indicating that the model of no arbitration was to 
be the final and exclusive forum.  
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW: MUGESERA AND  
SECONDARY LEVELS OF APPELLATE REVIEW  
The case of Mugesera dealt primarily with substantive elements of 
immigration and criminal law. A high profile case, Mugesera consid-
ered the issue of whether a political figure in Rwanda, Léon Mugesera, 
had incited murder, genocide and hatred and committed a crime against 
humanity in Rwanda through a speech he delivered. The content of the 
speech led the Rwandan authorities to issue the equivalent of an arrest 
warrant against him and he fled the country, eventually taking up per-
manent residence in Canada. In 1995, the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration commenced deportation proceedings under the Immigra-
tion Act,96 on the ground that Mr. Mugesera had committed a criminal 
act or offence prior to being granted permanent residency. Mr. Muge-
sera was ordered deported by an adjudicator on July 11, 1996. He re-
ceived a hearing de novo by the Immigration and Refugee Board 
(Appeal Division) (“IAD”), which upheld the decision of the adjudica-
tor.97 On judicial review, the Federal Court, Trial Division, reversed the 
decision in part. The Trial Judge found that there was no basis for the 
allegations of crimes against humanity and misrepresentation but that 
the allegations regarding incitement to murder and incitement to geno-
cide and hatred were valid. He afforded great deference to the IAD’s 
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findings of fact, reviewing on a standard of patent unreasonableness.98 
The Federal Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Mugesera’s appeal. In reach-
ing this outcome, however, the Court of Appeal re-evaluated the find-
ings of fact made by the IAD.99
From an administrative law perspective, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Mugesera is interesting for its discussion of the applicable stan-
dard of review by a court conducting a secondary level of appellate 
review. In Mugesera, this describes the situation of the Federal Court of 
Appeal in its review of the Immigration Appeal Division decision. The 
Supreme Court held that the Federal Court of Appeal had “exceeded the 
scope of its judicial review function when it engaged in a broad-ranging 
review and reassessment of the IAD’s findings of fact.”100 It had implic-
itly applied a standard of correctness and reviewed the evidence as if it 
were the trier of fact. The Supreme Court reminds us that “[i]n a judicial 
review process, it is not open to the reviewing court to reverse a deci-
sion because it would have arrived at a different conclusion.”101
While the Supreme Court’s holding in this case is not new, it is a 
useful reaffirmation of the principles relating to the appropriate relation-
ship between courts and tribunals on judicial review.  
V. EXPERTISE AND DEFERENCE: MONSANTO 
Monsanto deals with the concept of the core expertise of an admin-
istrative tribunal, the expertise for which deference will be shown under 
the pragmatic and functional analysis used to determine the appropriate 
standard of review. It also discusses the ability of the parties to influ-
ence the degree of deference to be chosen by reviewing courts. 
The main issue in Monsanto concerned the obligations that exist on 
employers upon a partial wind up of a pension plan. More specifically, 
the question addressed was whether subsection 70(6) of the Ontario 
Pension Benefits Act102 requires an actuarial surplus to be distributed to 
plan members when a pension plan goes through only a partial wind up. 
After the Superintendent of Financial Services, the provincial pension 
                                                                                                                                
98 [2001] F.C.J. No. 724. See also Mugesera, supra, note 6, at para. 29. 
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100 Mugesera, supra, note 6, at para. 36. 
101 Id., at para. 40. 
102 R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8. 
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regulator, refused to approve the partial wind up report of Monsanto 
Canada Inc. because it did not provide for distribution of surplus assets, 
the matter came before the Financial Services Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). 
The Tribunal held that subsection 70(6) of the Act did not require distri-
bution. On appeal, the Ontario Divisional Court overturned the Tribu-
nal’s decision and the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional 
Court decision.103
At the Divisional Court level, the Court reviewed the Tribunal deci-
sion on a standard of reasonableness and the Court of Appeal held that 
the Divisional Court was correct in doing so. Before the Supreme Court, 
the parties submitted an agreement that the standard of review should be 
reasonableness. The Supreme Court held, however, that because the 
standard of review is a question of law, it cannot be determined by 
agreement of the parties.104 Moreover, applying the four factors of the 
pragmatic and functional test, the Court determined, unlike the lower 
courts, that correctness was the appropriate standard of review. The 
Court held, in particular, that the factors dealing with relative expertise 
of the tribunal and the nature of the problem signalled that less defer-
ence should be owed. Under its enabling statute, the Tribunal had re-
sponsibility for adjudicating in more than one area and it was primarily 
adjudicative. As well, its members did not necessarily arrive with exper-
tise in pensions although the statute advised that in appointing members 
to the Tribunal and assigning panels “to the extent practicable, expertise 
and experience in the regulated sectors should be taken into account.”105 
In the Court’s opinion, there was “little to indicate that the legislature 
intended to create a body with particular expertise over the statutory 
interpretation of the Act.”106 The Court held also that the nature of the 
problem was a “pure question of law” that was not at the core of the 
tribunal’s expertise.107
It is very difficult to comprehend how the act of interpreting a ques-
tion about pension wind up is not within the core expertise of a body set 
up to decide pension appeals, even if there are other subject matters that 
                                                                                                                                
103 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2000), 3 
B.L.R. (3d) 99, revd [2001] O.J. No. 963 (Div. Ct.), affd [2002] O.J. No. 4407 (C.A.). 
104 Monsanto, supra, note 7, at para. 6. 
105 Id., at para. 11. 
106 Monsanto, id., at para. 12. 
107 Id., at paras. 8, 16. 
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the Tribunal handles as well. However, the decision in Monsanto seems 
to form part of a trend. According less deference to tribunal interpreta-
tions of provisions of their statutes which also may have a common law 
meaning has been the result in other recent Supreme Court cases. In 
addition to Monsanto, one finds a similar finding on deference in recent 
cases like Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn.108 
where it was held that no deference is owed to the CRTC in its interpre-
tation of what constitutes “the supporting structure of a transmission 
line” under the Telecommunications Act.109 This trend is somewhat dis-
concerting. As I have argued elsewhere, the decisions made by tribunals 
— in individual cases, vis-à-vis the public interest or in their delegated 
rule-making functions — are part of the development of governmental 
policy aimed to regulate the social or economic industry they have been 
called upon to manage.110 Their interpretations of the statutes they ad-
minister are necessarily informed by the experiences they have acquired 
in the management of their sector. One would imagine that the tribunal’s 
interpretation of the provisions of these statutes should attract some 
deference, even if these provisions may also have an ordinary meaning 
at common law, for in creating the tribunal, the legislature has made the 
choice to allow this decision-maker instead of the courts to determine 
the meanings appropriate to the regulation of an industry. An important 
part of what shapes the tribunal’s interpretation are experiences that 
stem from the daily operational context of administering its legislation, 
a context that the legislature has entrusted the tribunal to develop in 
order to effectively regulate its sector.111 As Dickson J. (as he then was) 
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another example of the correctness standard being applied to a tribunal interpretation of its legisla-
tion see Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue — M.N.R.) v. Mattel Canada Inc., [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 37, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100. 
109 S.C. 1993, c. 38. 
110 See Laverne A. Jacobs, “Recent Developments in Tribunal Standing: Bransen Construc-
tion Ltd. and Tribunal Impartiality” (2003) 50 Admin. L.R. (3d) 123, at 131.  
111 The theory that the internal operational context and normative ordering of the tribunal 
are essential to a proper understanding of the decision-making process of administrative bodies has 
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held in Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v. New Bruns-
wick Liquor Corp.:112
The labour board is a specialized tribunal which administers a 
comprehensive statute regulating labour relations. In the 
administration of that regime, a board is called upon not only to find 
facts and decide questions of law, but also to exercise its 
understanding of the body of jurisprudence that has developed around 
the collective bargaining system, as understood in Canada, and its 
labour relations sense acquired from accumulated experience in the 
area.113  
Although he was speaking of the labour board, these ideas are gen-
erally applicable. However, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Monsanto 
suggests that the concept of a tribunal administering a statute disappears 
in situations where the tribunal has been set up to review decisions made 
in more than one regulatory sector. It presupposes that the administra-
tion of a statute only occurs when a tribunal has been established to take 
care of one unique statute and to do so as a primary decision-maker. But 
there is no reason to believe that review-oriented bodies do not have 
expertise in the statutes over which they have jurisdiction. Can regulat-
ing a sector under a statutory regime realistically be parsed in the man-
ner suggested by the Supreme Court? Moreover, the Court’s general 
approach of deference to the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec, a re-
view body with wide-ranging powers over several statutes, as seen in 
other cases this term such as Okwuobi is also hard to reconcile with 
Monsanto.  
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Monsanto reflects 
these considerations and offers an approach that pays respect to both 
legislative intention and administrative law practicalities: 
The Act gives the Tribunal the central adjudicative role in the 
specialized administrative structure set up to regulate pensions in 
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Ontario. While the Tribunal deals with other regulated sectors in 
addition to pensions, the Financial Services Commission of Ontario 
Act requires that, to the extent practicable, members are appointed 
with experience and expertise in the regulated sectors and that they are 
assigned to cases which draw on that experience and expertise. Hence 
the Tribunal must be seen as having a relative expertise in adjudicating 
questions relating to pensions.114
Overall, the trend signalled by Monsanto highlights some of the possible 
dangers of interpreting too narrowly legislative intent with respect to 
expertise.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the 2004-2005 Supreme Court term saw intense ac-
tivity centred on the exercise of determining legislative intent. Most of 
the Court’s attention was focused on deciding questions of jurisdiction 
ratione materiae. The deep divides among members of the Court re-
garding the most appropriate method to use when dealing with two 
competing administrative tribunals led to a revisitation of the Weber 
principles and has invited us to consider the need to incorporate parame-
ters and guiding factors into the “essential character” test. In what I have 
termed a contest between expertise and expediency, the cases decided 
this term on exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction between tribunals 
have shown an unfortunate tendency to favour convenient process at the 
expense of experienced decision-making. Considering the wishes of the 
individual litigant and whether there should be limitations on the nature 
of the facts to be examined in the “essential character test” would be 
useful. Generally, the tests to be used leave many unanswered questions 
and much room for development in the jurisprudence. It is more than 
likely that the issues the Court has faced surrounding exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction this term will resurface in the future.115 All told, 
one cannot help but note the resurgence of jurisdictional type questions 
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this term; or to note that the search for legislative intent that was created 
to take administrative law away from “jurisdictional” or “collateral” 
questions has ironically led to a renewed examination of jurisdiction, 
this time couched within the context of legislative intent. After a very 
intense term, one looks forward to following the path of development 
that the administrative law jurisprudence will take next term. 
 
 
 
